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PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER RETAILERS
AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTORS IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION: SUFFICIENCY
OF A SINGLE CONTACT
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, The Supreme
Court attempted to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the appli-
cation of the "minimum contacts" doctrine in a products liability
context. This Comment examines the source of this uncertainty,
then argues that Woodson is inconsistent with the ultimate goals
of the "minimum contacts" doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
Marketing techniques have changed drastically in recent years.
Products are passed through the hands of an increasing number
of middlemen before ultimately reaching the consumer.' This de-
velopment, along with the increasingly complex nature of the
products themselves, 2 has increased the risk of injury to the con-
sumer. Fortunately, substantive law has been quick to react. In
order to facilitate compensation of tort victims, the fault basis for
recovery has been largely supplanted by strict liability.3
However, the tort victim still must overcome procedural barri-
ers to recovery.4 Foremost among these is securing personal ju-
risdiction over all the potential defendants. Consider the
following fact situation: Manufacturer, whose products are sold
nationwide, sells a product to Regional Distributor, who does
1. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432,176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
2. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Feezer, Manufacturer's Liability for Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective
Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1938).
3. For a discussion of the status of the strict liability rule in the United
States, see 1 R. HtRscH & L BArnEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS L Innxry § 4:41
(2d ed. 1975).
4. PRODUCT LIABILrY: LAw, PRACnCE, SCIENCE 661 (2d ed. P. Rheingold & S.
Birnbaum 1975).
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business in states A, B, and C. Regional Distributor, in turn, sells
the product to Retailer, whose activities are confined to state A.
Consumer, a resident of state D, purchases the product from Re-
tailer in state A and carries it back to state D where a defect in
the product causes an injury. What are the consumer's alterna-
tives?
The problems involved in securing personal jurisdiction over
the national manufacturer have been solved.5 However, the main-
tenance of personal jurisdiction over the retailer and regional dis-
tributor presents complex issues on which the lower courts have
disagreed.6 The Supreme Court recently attempted to resolve the
conflict among the lower courts in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson.7 This Comment focuses on the factors responsible
for the confusion prior to Woodson, provides an analysis of the
opinion, and forecasts the effect this case should have on prod-
ucts liability litigation in the future.
The jurisdictional reach of a state court is limited by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the "long arm"
statute of that particular state.8 Because the due process clause
qualifies state "long arm" statutes, this Comment is restricted to
an examination of due process limitiations. 9
5. This is due to the following dicta from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), which has confirmed the approach taken by most
lower courts:
If the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor... is not sim-
ply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer
or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its products in
other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owners or to others. The forum State does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction
over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce
with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the fo-
rum State.
Id. at 297-98.
In these cases involving national manufacturers, jurisdiction is not really based
solely on the presence of the product in the forum state. Although the presence of
the product and the occurrence of injury initiate the filing of the suit, jurisdiction
actually rests on the manufacturer's prior course of conduct. The continuing pur-
poseful relationship with the forum state established by injecting products into a
national stream of commerce merely manifests itself in the transaction out of
which an individual suit arises. Thus, it is somewhat misleading to label these na-
tional manufacturer cases as examples of jurisdiction being based on a single con-
tact.
6. Compare, e.g., Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d
647 (1967) with Tyson v. Whitaker and Son, Inc., 407 A.2d 1 (Me. 1979).
7. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
8. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 713 (4th Cir. 1966), discusses the
respective roles of the due process clause and the state long-arm statute.
9. Many states have drafted long-arm statutes which are designed to allow
the state to exercise jurisdiction up to the maximum point permitted by the fed-
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BACKGROUND
Traditional rules of personal jurisdiction were based on
power.'0 The power of a state to adjudicate a particular contro-
versy extended only as far as its borders." These jurisdictional
rules adequately served the needs of a parochial society in which
almost all economic activity was conducted on a local basis.
There was rarely any need for a state to extend its jurisdictional
reach beyond its borders.
However, as the fundamental character of American society be-
gan to change, it became necessary to revise this traditional stan-
dard. Revolutionary developments in transportation12 and
communication rapidly transformed the localized, self-sufficient
economic communities of the 1800's into the highly interdepen-
dent national economy of today.'3 Commercial transactions be-
tween parties separated by the full continent, at one time
unheard of, became commonplace. 14 Thus, while each state re-
tained a separate legal and political identity, distinctions in the
economic sphere were blurred.
In order to meet the problems that accompanied the develop-
eral constitution. When this is the case, the constitutional issue and the statutory
construction issue are identical. Annot., 19 AJ.R.3d 61 (1968).
10. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917); Barry, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 13 VA. L
REV. 175, 177 (1927).
According to the Court in McDonald v. Mabee:
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized
times it is not necessary to maintain that power throughout proceedings
properly begun, and although submission to the jurisdiction by appear-
ance may take the place of service upon the person .... No doubt there
may be some extension of the means of acquiring jurisdiction beyond
service or appearance, but the foundation should be borne in mind.
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
11. See generally Comment, Tortious Act As a Basis for Jurisdiction in Prod-
ucts Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAm L REV. 671, 672-75 (1965).
12. Railroads were the major transportational development in the 19th cen-
tury. In the early 20th century, the increasing frequency of automobile travel also
influenced jurisdictional considerations. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), il-
lustrates the significant role of the automobile in relaxing jurisdictional limita-
tions. In Hess, the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts statute which declared
that the use of Massachusetts highways was equivalent to the appointment of the
registrar as agent for service of process in any action based on an accident taking
place on such highways. This rule was the equivalent of the "implied consent"
theory for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See Lafayette Ins. Co.
v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404, 407 (1855).
13. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
14. Id. at 222-24.
ment of a national economy, the "power" doctrine was gradually
expanded. Through the development of fictional devices such as
"implied consent,"15 "presence,"16 and "doing business' 7 it be-
came possible to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants. At
the same time, however, the increasing reliance on these fictions
ensured the doom of the "power" theory. In the words of Justice
Holmes, "The Constitution is not to be satisfied with a fiction."' 8
Thus, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,19 the Supreme
Court rejected the outmoded "power" theory in favor of the more
flexible "minimum contacts" doctrine.20
Eschewing the application of a "mechanical or quantitative"
test,2 1 the "minimum contacts" doctrine emphasized instead a
case-by-case evaluation of fairness.22 Considerations relevant to
this evaluation were: an estimate of the inconveniences which de-
fendant would suffer by being subjected to suit in the foreign fo-
rum,23 whether the activity was continuous or isolated,24 and
whether the activity was related to the cause of action.25
International Shoe was revolutionary not as much in its result
as in its approach. By eliminating the need for fictionalized ex-
ceptions, the "minimum contacts" doctrine allowed courts to fo-
cus on the underlying realities.2 6 The net effect was to expand
the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction.
This expansive effect became even more apparent following the
Supreme Court's decision in Perkins v. Benquet Consolidated
Mining Co. 27 In Perkins the defendant corporation maintained its
main office in Ohio. A suit was filed against the corporation in
Ohio based on a transaction that took place outside of that state.
The Supreme Court found that the corporation's contacts with
Ohio were sufficiently strong to sustain jurisdiction, even though
they were unrelated to the cause of action.28 In reaching this con-
15. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
16. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
17. A fictional finding of "doing business" was sometimes necessary to deter-
mine whether a corporation was subject to jurisdiction based on the "implied con-
sent" or "presence" theories. See Kurland, The Supreme Cour4 The Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHL L. REv. 569, 584(1958).
18. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Id. at 316.
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 317.
24. Id. at 317-18.
25. Id. at 318.
26. Id.
27. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
28. Id. at 448.
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clusion, the Court distinguished between those causes of action
that arose directly out of the contact with the forum state, and
causes of action that were unrelated to the contacts. 29 In the lat-
ter instance, jurisdiction could still be sustained, but the contacts
had to be more substantial.30 Conversely, when the cause of ac-
tion arose directly out of defendant's activity in the forum state,
the contact did not have to be so strong to support jurisdiction.3'
The Court did not stop here. In McGee v. International Life In-
surance Co.,32 due process limitations were further relaxed. Ju-
risdiction over the defendant insurance company in McGee was
based on the mailing of a single insurance policy into the forum
state. McGee seemed very encouraging when considered in a
products liability context, for it recognized that a single, isolated
act might be a sufficient contact for due process purposes when
the cause of action arose out of that act.33 Justice Black, writing
for the majority, cited with approval a case where jurisdiction was
upheld based on the commission of a single tort in the forum
state.34 Thus, it was conceivable that a corporation might be sub-
ject to jurisdiction based solely on the fact that its product had
caused an injury in the forum state. Extending McGee into the
field of products liability was the next logical step, considering
the expansive trend that was developing.35
29. Id. at 445-46.
30. Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analy-
sis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136-44 (1966). The authors refer to this type of jurisdic-
tion as "general" jurisdiction.
31. Id. at 1144-53. This type of jurisdiction is labeled "specific" jurisdiction by
the authors.
32. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
33. Id. at 223.
34. Id. at 223 n.2. In that case, Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116
Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951), defendant maintained a roofing business in Massachu-
setts where it conducted most of its business. The roofer was employed by plain-
tiff to re-roof plaintiffs house in Vermont. While doing the job, the roofer
negligently put holes in the roof; causing it to leak. Even though this was the roof-
ers only contact with Vermont, the supreme court of that state upheld the jurisdic-
tion of the Vermont courts, noting however, that the Supreme Court of the United
States had not yet ruled on the issue:
We are of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court has left un-
decided whether isolated tortious activity could result in a proper subjec-
tion of a foreign corporation to suit in the forum when the cause of action
arose out of that activity; no generally applicable standards can be ascer-
tained from the decisions beyond the statements in the International
Shoe case.
Id. at 573, 80 A.2d at 666.
35. At least one commentator took an even more extreme position: "It is at
The Court erected a barrier to such expansion, however, in
Hanson v. Denckla,36 an action for the adjudication of a trust.
While acknowledging the trend towards expanding personal juris-
diction over nonresidents,3 7 Hanson made it clear that limitations
still existed: "It is essential in each case that there be some act
by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws."38 This requirement of a
"purposeful" contact proved to be particularly difficult to deal
with in a products liability context where the defendant was a re-
tailer or regional distributor serving a limited geographical mar-
ket.39 The problem primarily arose when the product caused an
injury outside of the geographical scope of defendant's business,
and its only contact with the forum state was the presence of the
product and the occurrence of injury there.40 When this was the
case, the court's decision hinged on its interpretation of Hanson.
least arguable that as a result of McGee there is now almost no constitutional limi-
tation on a state court's assertion of jurisdiction." Note, Personal Jurisdiction in
Minnesota over Absent Defendants, 42 MmxN. L. Rav. 909, 922 (1958).
36. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
37. As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
states, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar
increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transporta-
tion has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome.
In response to these changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction
over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff...
to the flexible standard of International Shoe .... But it is a mistake to
assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on
the personal jurisdiction of state courts.
Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted).
38. Id. at 253.
39. See, e.g., Tyson v. Whitaker, 407 A.2d 1 (Me. 1979).
40. Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967),
presented a typical fact situation: Plaintiffs purchased an automobile from the de-
fendant, an Oregon automobile dealer, whose business was entirely confined to
that state. When plaintiffs traveled to Washington, they were overcome by carbon
monoxide fumes, allegedly due to a defective exhaust system. A suit was filed
against the dealer in Washington.
The rationale employed to sustain jurisdiction over national manufacturers
could not be applied in these circumstances:
The distinction is obvious. Though it may be just to infer minimal con-
tacts as to a manufacturer who produces goods and puts them into the
broad stream of interstate commerce as was done in Gray v. American Ra-
diator and Standard Sanitary Corp... . we believe that no such inference
is warranted where there is a sale by an out-of-state retailer to his local
customer, if nothing further appears by way of a purposeful act on his part
or possession of information, which would in any way charge the retailer
with knowledge that his transaction might have out-of-state consequences.
Id. at 889, 425 P.2d at 656.
A similar distinction between manufacturers and retailers was made in Granite
States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972), and Pel-
legrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974). In Pellegrini, the court recog-
nized that such a distinction was a technical one at best, but was justified as a
matter of policy.
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Two alternatives were possible: Hanson's "purposefully avails"
language could be applied literally, or Hanson could be carefully
limited to its facts.
In those cases where Hanson was applied literally, jurisdiction
could not be sustained.41 There was no jurisdiction because the
defendant's only contacts with the forum state were the presence
of his product and the occurrence of injury there. These contacts,
standing alone, did not satisfy the "purposefully avails" require-
ment of Hanson.42 In this line of cases, jurisdictional reach was
limited to the states in which the retailer conducted its busi-
ness.43 Only in those states could the retailer be said to have ac-
ted purposefully.44
Other courts, however, refused to apply Hanson literally, and
instead limited it to its facts, or ignored it altogether. 5 The argu-
ment for this position was based on the necessity of carefully ex-
amining the unique facts of each case.4 Hanson, a trust
41. Tilley v. Keller Truck & Implement Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968);
Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972);
Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974); Oliver v. American Motors
Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
42. Of course, jurisdiction might be sustained even where Hanson is applied
literally if, for example, the court finds other collateral contacts existed between
the retailer and the forum state, such as advertising. The question then would be
one of degree: what quantum of contacts will be required before defendant can be
said to have "purposefully availed" itself? Compare, e.g., King v. Hailey Chevrolet
Co., 462 F.2d 63 (6th Cir. 1972) with Easterling v. Cooper Motors, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 1
(M.D.N.C. 1960). The scope of this Comment, however, is limited to the sufficiency
of a single contact as a basis for asserting jurisdiction.
43. See case cited in note 39 supra.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Tyson v. Whitaker, 407 A.2d 1 (Me. 1979).
46. The argument for this position was perhaps best expressed in Phillips v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). In addressing itself
to the "purposefully avails" requirement of Hanson, the court explained:
We do not think the quoted language can be construed literally. To do so
is to revitalize the "implied consent" theory emasculated by the Interna-
tional Shoe case and to reverse the trend expanding state jurisdiction
over nonresidents which trend was recognized in the Hanson decision. To
make the requirement of purposeful activity within the state a necessary
prerequisite to personal jurisdiction in all cases undermines the notion
that the facts of each case must be examined to decide whether it is fair to
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. Furthermore, it is apparent that
all personal jurisdiction questions cannot be determined by asking
whether the defendant purposefully conducted activities within the forum
state to obtain the benefits and protections of its laws. Tortious and negli-
gent acts are obvious examples in which it is unrealistic to say that the
actors first considered the laws of the state in which such acts were com-
mitted. A rule limiting jurisdiction to defendants who "purposefully" con-
adjudication, could easily be distinguished from a products liabil-
ity action, particularly where a mobile product, such as an auto-
mobile or airplane, was involved.47 In these cases, the
foreseeability of the product's use in the forum state was some-
times employed as a jurisdiction-helping element.48
WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. V. WOODSON
It was against this background that the Supreme Court recently
decided World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.49 Harry and
Kay Robinson, plaintiffs in Woodson, had purchased a new auto-
mobile from defendant retailer Seaway Volkswagen. A year later
the Robinsons, who were New York residents when they
purchased the automobile, decided to move to Arizona. While
passing through Oklahoma, they were injured in an accident, al-
legedly caused by a defect in the automobile. Mrs. Robinson re-
quired extensive medical treatment.
The Robinsons filed a products liability suit in Oklahoma state
court. In addition to the retailer (Seaway), the manufacturer
(Audi), the importer (Volkswagen), and the regional distributor
(World-Wide) were joined as defendants. Only World-Wide and
Seaway contested jurisdiction. Seaway's retail market was lim-
ited to New York, while World-Wide distributed automobiles to
retailers in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey. Essentially,
Seaway and World-Wide claimed that since neither had con-
ducted any business in Oklahoma, that state could not properly
assert personal jurisdiction. The lower state court rejected this
claim and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affi ried.50 The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed.51
The Supreme Court began its analysis by outlining the factors
that had been used to determine "fairness" in previous decisions.
These included "the burden on the defendant, the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute,. . . the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief.., the interstate judi-
cial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in fur-
duct activities within the state cannot properly be applied in product
liability cases in view of the fortuitous route by which products enter any
particular state.
Id. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735.
47. See, e.g., Tyson v. Whitaker, 407 A.2d 1 (Me. 1979).
48. Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974). See aso
the decision of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
49. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
50. 585 P.2d 351 (Okla. 1978), revd, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
51. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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thering fundamental substantive social policies."5 2
An additional factor was considered in Woodson. Earlier lower
court decisions often cited foreseeability as a relevant jurisdic-
tional criterion in products liability cases. These cases held that
when it was foreseeable that defendant's product would be used
in the forum state, it was not unreasonable to allow that state to
assert jurisdiction.53 This jurisdiction-helping element was nar-
rowed considerably in Woodson:
The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state. Rather, it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.5 4
EFFECTS OF WooDsoN ON JU.iSDICTIONAL ANALYSIS
The modified concept of foreseeability is especially important in
products liability litigation because past decisions tended to rely
on traditional notions of forseeability.55 Still, the new test is not
objectionable. The problem is that the Court is unclear as to the
factors to be taken into consideration in applying the test. It is
important to remember that the "minimum contacts" doctrine,
first adopted in International Shoe, is ultimately based on fair-
ness.56 In International Shoe the Supreme Court expressly re-
52. Id. at 292.
53. See, e.g., Williams v. Vick Chem. Co., 279 F. Supp. 833, 837 (S.D. Iowa 1967);
Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963);
Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of
Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300, 313 (1970).
54. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had applied the
traditional concept of foreseeability in its opinion, and consequently concluded
that the assumption of jurisdiction was fair.
In the case before us, the product being sold and distributed by the peti-
tioners is by its very design and purpose so mobile that petitioners can
foresee its possible use in Oklahoma. This is especially true of the distrib-
utor, who has the exclusive right to distribute such automobile [sic] in
New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. The evidence presented below
demonstrated that goods sold and distributed by the petitioners were
used in the State of Oklahoma, and under the facts we believe it reason-
able to infer, given the retail value of the automobile, that the petitioners
derive substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are
used in the State of Oklahoma. This being the case, we hold that under
the facts presented, the trial court was justified in concluding that the pe-
titioners derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this
State.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 585 P.2d 351,354 (Okla. 1978), rev'd, 444
U.S. 286 (1980).
55. Supra note 53.
56. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
fused to apply a mechanical or quantitative test.57 Instead, the
Court chose to decide each case on its own facts weighing all the
appropriate factors. 58
In applying the Woodson test of foreseeability, the Court ap-
pears to have lost sight of the underlying notion of fair play.
There is nothing inherently unfair with a test that limits a re-
tailer's amenability to suit to those states in which it should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court. This gives the retailer
the opportunity to purchase insurance so that it can lessen the
burden of defending a suit in the foreign forum.59 However, in or-
der to insure a fair and uniform application of such a test, there
must be careful consideration of all the surrounding circum-
stances.
Certain language in the Woodson opinion creates the danger
that lower courts in applying Woodson may not consider all these
circumstances. For example, the Court stated:
It is true that automobiles are uniquely mobile,. . that they did play a
crucial role in the expansion of personal jurisdiction through the fiction of
implied consent,... and that some of the cases have treated the automo-
bile as a "dangerous instrumentality". But today, under the regime of In-
ternational Shoe, we see no difference for jurisdictional purposes between
an automobile and any other chattel
6 0
This apparently precludes consideration of the uniquely mobile
nature of a product as a relevant jurisdictional criterion.
The court also cited with approval a hypothetical posed in
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,61 as an example of
where maintenance of jurisdiction would be unfair.62 By simply
citing to the hypothetical and not fully explaining it, the Court
creates an additional difficulty. In the hypothetical, a Penn-
sylvania resident with Pennsylvania license plates on his automo-
bile purchases a set of tires from a California retailer. The
Pennsylvania resident then returns to his home state where a
blowout occurs. The retailer should know that the car will be
driven back to Pennsylvania, yet the court indicates that an as-
sumption of jurisdiction by Pennsylvania courts would be unfair.
57. Id. at 319.
58. As stated in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), "[TIhis determina-
tion is one in which few answers will be written in black and white. The greys are
dominant and even among them the shades are innumerable." Id. at 92 (quoting
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948)).
59. 444 U.S. at 297.
60. Id. at 297 n.11. The failure of the Court to consider the uniquely mobile
nature of the automobile in Woodson is confusing considering the decision in Hess
v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), where the Court placed particular emphasis on
the automobile as a "dangerous instrumentality."
61. 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956).
62. 444 U.S. at 296.
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Woodson's favorable reference to this hypothetical might in-
duce lower courts to attach no jurisdictional significance to the
possibility of an express or implied understanding between the
parties that the purchaser would carry the product to a particular
foreign state. Surely the retailer is in a position to insulate itself
from liability through the purchase of insurance. Particularly if
the retailer's business is located on an interstate highway, as it is
likely to be in such a case, it should anticipate being sued in a for-
eign forum. If the retailer still concludes that insurance is too
costly, its alternative is to refuse the sale.63
Another hypothetical will help to illustrate the problems that
might arise in applying Woodson. A local retailer sells fireworks
on the northern border of North Carolina, where fireworks are le-
gal.6 4 In all states to the north of that state, fireworks are illegal.
This retailer is clearly catering to a market consisting of residents
from those northern states who cannot purchase fireworks within
their home state. If the understanding of the parties and the na-
ture of the product are considered, it is highly foreseeable that
the retailer may be subjected to suit in a northern state. How-
ever, even though a highly dangerous product is involved, juris-
diction might fail under Woodson: "The 'dangerous
instrumentality' concept apparently was never used to support
personal jurisdiction, and to the extent it has relevance today it
bears not on jurisdiction but on the possible desirablity of impos-
ing substantive principles such as strict liability.65 Thus, the
transaction might be treated as any other local retail sale.66
It is here that the uncertainty surrounding Woodson becomes
63. Id. at 297.
64. The applicable laws governing fireworks are fictional for the purposes of
this hypothetical.
65. 444 U.S. at 297 n.11. Compare this with the following quotation from Velan-
dra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1964):
[T]he nature of the product may well have a bearing upon the issue of
minimum contact, with a lesser volume of inherently dangerous products
constituting a more significant contact with the state than would a larger
volume of products offering little or no hazard to the inhabitants of the
state. A careful and discriminating analysis of the nature and quality of
the defendants' contacts with the forum state must be made in each case.
Id. at 298.
66. This hypothetical raises another problem: What is the relationship
between Woodson's test of forseeability and the "purposefully avails" requirement
of Hanson? The fireworks retailer appears to be purposefully availing himself of
the benefits of the laws of those northern states that prohibit fireworks. Neverthe-
less, as indicated in the text, the test of forseeability might not be satisfied.
most apparent. The test is purportedly based on a defendant's
reasonable anticipation of being haled into a foreign forum, yet
consideration of the factors most critical to such a determination
might be disallowed. A test based on objective factors, such as
the nature of the product, would be fairly easy for plaintiff to sat-
isfy. If these factors are disallowed, the plaintiff would be forced
to probe the defendant retailer's mind in order to prove a reason-
able anticipation of being sued in the forum state. The resulting
burden on the plaintiff would be greatly increased as he is forced
to rely on subjective considerations. Pre-trial discovery would be
the only possible means by which a plaintiff could meet this bur-
den. In order to conduct discbvery, plaintiff would need to travel
to the home state of the foreign retailer.6 7 This defeats the major
reason for suing locally, namely, avoiding a trip to the distant
state. If plaintiff is in a position to afford such a trip, he would be
better off filing his suit in the foreign forum initially and avoiding
the jurisdictional issue entirely. The only resulting disadvantage
would be the loss of a potentially sympathetic local jury. Even if
plaintiff does decide to make the trip for discovery purposes, the
costs of discovery itself might be prohibitive. In fact, the most ex-
pensive type of discovery would probably be necessary, discovery
by deposition. A New York attorney has estimated that discovery
by deposition in that state costs roughly three thousand dollars
per lawyer per day.68
Plaintiff is unlikely to go to such great lengths to secure juris-
diction over the foreign retailer, especially when the results of
discovery are so uncertain. Plaintiff would, in effect, be gambling
on exposing evidence of defendant's reasonable anticipation of
being haled into the foreign forum. Perhaps plaintiff would suc-
ceed, if, for example, discovery revealed that defendant had suc-
cessfully contested jurisdiction in several prior suits in that
forum.69 These results, however, are highly unlikely. Further-
more, because the plaintiff has already secured jurisdiction over
the manufacturer of the product, the incentive to pursue the dis-
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 45d(2):
A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be taken may be
required to attend an examination only in the county wherein he resides
or is employed or transacts his business in person, or at such other conve-
nient place as is fixed by an order of court. A nonresident of the district
may be required to attend only in the county wherein he is served with a
subpoena, or within 40 miles from the place of service, or at such other
convenient place as is fixed by an order of court
Most states have comparable provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1989
(West 1955 & Supp. 1981).
68. A Quicker Route to Court, Bus. WEE, Dec. 5, 1977, at 89.
69. Such a finding might be sufficient to show that it was reasonably foresee-
able to the defendant that he would be subject to suit in that forum in the future.
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covery necessary to join the retailer as well is diminished.70 This
leaves the trial court with only one factor relevant to the Wood-
son test of foreseeability, the geographic scope of the retailer's
marketplace. Because the court is not within this geographic
area, jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
Thus, Woodson might be interpreted as effectively limiting the
retailer's amenability to suit to a specific geographic area. This is
a standard that can only be mechanically applied, an approach ex-
pressly rejected in International Shoe. The flexible balancing test
advocated by International Shoe would be precluded by Wood-
son's test of foreseeability. Also, the retailer is accorded prefer-
ential treatment by being insulated from liability. In this respect
Woodson is unfair to the manufacturer. The retailer is just as vi-
tal a link in the chain of distribution as the manufacturer, and
there is no reason to favor one over the other.
The only way a flexible approach can be preserved is to allow
the trial court to consider all the circumstances. 71 Then the trial
court will be able to evaluate each case on the basis of its unique
facts. This flexibility is essential to insure truly fair and reason-
able results, the ultimate goal of the "minimum contacts" doc-
trine.
Woodson's inconsistency with the "minimum contacts" doctrine
can perhaps be explained by examining the underlying substan-
tive law. Ideally, substantive law should have no bearing on the
due process analysis. However, because of the wide divergence
among laws governing products liability, it is possible that the
70. The manufacturer is usually the most solvent defendant in a products lia-
bility action. Siegel, 'Longarm' Jurisdiction Pinched by High Court, But Not Bro-
ken, NAT'L LJ., March 17, 1980, at 18.
71. At least one court applied a standard of foreseeability similar to that in
Woodson, and came up with a conflicting result because it considered the tradi-
tional uses of the product. In Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 IlM. App. 3d 296,
367 N.E.2d 118 (1977), jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer of a defective air-
plane was upheld based on the presence of the product and the occurrence of in-
jury in the forum state. Fundamental to the court's decision was a consideration
of the nature of the product: "It is not offensive to 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice' to say to the manufacturer of a transient product such as
an airplane that it must defend the lawsuit in a reasonable foreseeable place." Id.
at 302, 367 N.E.2d at 123. As in Woodson, the court considered the foreseeability of
being subjected to suit in the forum state, and not the mere foreseeability that the
product would reach that state. In both cases, a uniquely mobile product was in-
volved. Admittedly, in Braband other collateral contacts were present, but the
majority felt that the existence of these additional contacts was unnecessary in or-
der to sustain jurisdiction.
Supreme Court allowed substantive concerns to influence its de-
cision of the procedural issue in Woodson.
In recent years, an increasing number of states have shifted
from a fault basis for recovery to strict liability.72 However, a few
states have been reluctant to adopt strict liability,7 3 and even
among those that have, some have been more liberal than others
in facilitating plaintiff recovery.74 Similarly, some states are more
liberal than others in assessing personal injury damages.75
Rules governing the choice of law in products liability litigation
have also changed.76 The law of the place where the injury oc-
curred will no longer necessarily be the law applied to settle the
dispute.77 One commentator has pointed out that this might in-
duce a court to sustain jurisdiction in order to ensure application
of that forum's substantive law, even where the requisite mini-
mum contacts are lacking.78 Thus, the tightening of jurisdictional
standards in Woodson may represent an attempt to discourage
the resulting possibility of forum shopping.7 9
The problems involved in depriving tort victims of a broad
choice of forums,80 however, outweigh the benefits of the Wood-
son approach. Because of changes in marketing techniques, 81 the
place where the injury occurs may be the only place where the
plaintiff can join all defendants. Woodson increases the liklihood
of a multiplicity of suits by requiring the tort victim to sue each of
these defendants at its place of business, to the extent that de-
fendant's business is conducted on a limited geographical basis.82
72. See note 3 supra.
73. See note 3 supra.
74. Strict liability should not be confused with absolute liability. Strict liabil-
ity requires proof of a defect The definition of a defect varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. PRODucT LABamrry: LAw, PRACTICE, SCIENCE 2-3 (2d ed. P. Rheingold
& S. Birnbaum 1975).
75. See generally S. LEmowrrz, PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES (1971).
76. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 30, at 1128-29.
77. Id. at 1129. Choice of law questions are resolved on the basis of criteria
substantially similar to those used to analyze personal jurisdiction. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 258 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 224-25 (1977), Justice Brennan argued that the ju-
risdictional and choice of law questions should be decided together. He stressed
the fact that the forum state court would be better equipped to implement the pol-
icies underlying its own substantive laws, rather than those of another state. This
would be particularly appropriate in the area of products liability.
78. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 29, at 1132-33.
79. Id. at 1133.
80. Siegel, supra note 68.
81. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11L 2d 432,176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
82. A local retailer, by electing to establish its business in a jurisdiction adher-
ing to a negligence theory rather than strict liability, can avoid suits based on
strict liability principles because of Woodson. This is inappropriate where the re-
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Consequently, plaintiff may be forced to persuade a hostile jury
that may favor the local defendant. Each defendant may be able
to escape liability entirely by "pointing the finger" at the other de-
fendants when the suit is brought in negligence. These dangers
are accentuated when one or more defendants are insolvent, or
the substantive fault can be traced to a particular defendant.
CONCLUSION
In Woodson the increasingly dynamic field of products liability
collided with due process limitations on personal jurisdiction.
These two areas of law have developed in contrasting fashion.
Substantive rules of products liability have evolved steadily to-
ward facilitating plaintiff recovery, culminating in the adoption of
strict liability principles by most states.8 3 Rules governing per-
sonal jurisdiction, however, have not progressed so symmetri-
cally. Initially, the Supreme Court took an expansive view of the
power of a state to adjudicate disputes involving foreign defend-
ants. In International Shoe, Perkins, and McGee, jurisdictional
limitations were gradually relaxed. Hanson reversed this expan-
sive trend by imposing the requirement of a "purposeful" contact
with the forum state. However, lower courts disagreed over the
applicability of Hanson in a products liability context. As a re-
sult, the jurisdictional status of retailers and regional distributors
remained uncertain where a purposeful contact was lacking.
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve this uncertainty in
Woodson through its modified concept of foreseeability. Unfortu-
nately, the Court did not clearly explain how this concept is to be
applied. The resulting danger is that lower courts might interpret
Woodson so as to immunize the retailer and the regional distribu-
tor from suit beyond the geographical scope of their marketplace.
Perhaps the applicable substantive law and choice of law rules
influenced the decision in Woodson. Products liability laws vary
considerably from state to state, as do rules governing choice of
tailer has voluntarily chosen to sell a transient product such as an automobile or
airplane, or where the retailer has knowledge that a nontransient product will be
used in another state. In such cases, the retailer can protect itself by purchasing
insurance in advance. This is more desirable than requiring the tort victim to
shoulder the jurisdictional burden after an injury has already occurred. In addi-
tion, Woodson may deter retailers from doing business in those states that are
particularly liberal in facilitating recovery by tort victims.
83. See note 3 supra.
law. As a result, the selection of the forum may determine what
substantive law will apply. The Supreme Court's restrictive hold-
ing in Woodson, possibly prompted by this consideration, elimi-
nates any danger of forum shopping. The Court's approach,
however, is inconsistent with International Shoe's emphasis on
an overall consideration of fairness.
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